One Small Step: Anticipatory Diplomacy in Outer Space
概括
这3500亿美元space industry could grow to more than $1 trillion by 2040, spurring international interest in harnessing space resources. But this interest will bring with it a challenge: while existing international agreements like the Artemis Accords promote the peaceful and shared exploration of celestial bodies, they dolittle to address现有的科学研究活动和新兴机会（例如月球开采）之间的差异，特别是在极地纬度的水冰以及某些陨石坑的永久阴影深度。月球水冰将是外层空间探索和开发工作的重要资源，因为它可用于制造氢燃料电池，火箭燃料和宇航员的饮用水。鉴于月球的下表面重力以及与人类的表面上的人体空间操作的距离，它也将比将水从地面的表面传输到外层空间便宜。月亮拥有其他有价值的长期商品，例如氦3，这是低排放核融合能所需的燃料。
但是，当前的多边协议并未解决非政府运营商是否可以在天体上要求其使用或拥有他们提取的资源。此外，当前在轨道上时，空间对象注册过程用于卫星和其他航天器，但不包括用于在天体表面（例如采矿设备）表面使用的空间对象。这些差距几乎没有选择美国或其他Artemis协定国家来解决对天体领土主张的冲突。在最坏的情况下，这种不断增加的资源竞争（尤其是与中国和俄罗斯这样的其他主要太空大国）可能会升级为军事冲突。
采用新的条约或修改面临g Outer Space Treaty (OST) for modern space use is a slow process that may fail to meet the urgency of emerging space resource issues. However, the United States has another diplomatic avenue for faster action: revision of the existing United Nations’Guidelines for the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space在联合国和平使用外太空委员会（Copuos）的主持下。这样的过程避免了decade-long审议正式条约修正案。因此，美国应领导多边协议的制定，以通过对Copuos指南，OST或两者提出两个更新，从而从天体中提取资源。首先，应该为所有空间对象提供更新的注册过程，该过程应指定在天体的特定部分建立使用权的预期位置，时间表和类型。其次，联合国应建立争端解决程序，以允许和平解决对天体表面的竞争主张。这些策略将为和平地在太空中开展新的采矿业务提供必要的基础。
挑战和机会
目前，外太空类似于野外西部，因为科学创新和经济扩张的机会很多，但是几乎没有政治或法律基础设施来促进感兴趣的陆地派系之间有序合作。例如，任何声称对月球领土采矿权权利的国家都处于摇摇欲坠的法律基础上，充其量是：《外层空间条约》和随后的指导方针Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space，由联合国和平使用外太空委员会颁布的，不提供合法合理或国际认可的发展权，执法结构或反转机制。如果据称一位索赔人侵犯了另一个人的领土权利，那么哪些法律制度可以用哪些法律制度来施加案件？此外，哪些机制会避免潜在的军事冲突升级？现在，答案是没有的。
鉴于未来几十年中外太空发展的巨大经济潜力，这是进步的不幸障碍。为了将潜在价值从角度看，新兴3500亿美元到2040年，太空行业可能会增长到超过1万亿美元，激发了国际兴趣的重大兴趣。一个潜在的有利可图的运营子集是空间开采，一个部门重视今天的价值为10亿美元，到2027年的潜在价值为30亿美元。一旦运营，太空采矿将成为宝贵的来源rare earth elements（例如，新近山，s邦等），其中60％目前是在China。Rare earth elements are necessary for essential technologies such as电动汽车，风力涡轮机，，，，计算机和医疗设备。Additionally, in the event that nuclear fusion becomes commercially viable in the long-term future, space mining will be an essential industry for securinghelium-3（HE-3），在月球上发现了丰富的同位素。最近的融合投资增加和融合研究的突破show the potential for fusion energy, but there is no guarantee of success. He-3 could serve as a critical fuel source for future nuclear fusion operations, anemerging能源生产的形式不含碳排放，可以为人类提供解决全球气候和能源危机的手段而不会失去能源丰度。丰富的Lunar HE-3可能意味着可以使用可预见的人类未来的清洁能源。
此外，外太空的探索和发展都需要水，无论是用于船员任务的饮用水形式，以及以飞船的火箭推进剂和燃料电池组件的形式。因为它花费超过100万美元运输a single cubic meter of water from Earth’s surface into low Earth orbit, extracting water from the lunar surface for use in outer space operations could be substantially more economical due to the moon’s lower escape velocity—in fact, lunar water ice is estimated to be worth$10 million per cubic meter.
这space mining sector and lunar development also offer promise far beyond Earth. Our moon is the perfect “first port of call” as humanity expands into outer space. It has lower surface gravity,极性冰矿床和丰富的raw materials例如铝及其作为我们最接近的天体邻居的地位，使其成为从地球上更深入太阳系的航天器的理想中途供应仓库和发射点。航天器可以从地球上发射，距离足够的燃料可以避开地球的重力，陆地和在月球上加油，并从其他地方的月球较弱的重力中更有效地发射到系统中。
All in all, the vast untapped scientific and economic potential of our moon underscores the need for policy innovation to fill the gaps in existing international space law and allow the development of outer space within internationally recognized legal lines. The imperative for leading on these matters falls to the United States as a nation uniquely poised to lead the space mining industry. Not only is the United States one of the global leaders in space operations, but U.S. domestic law, including the2015年商业空间发射竞争力法，为美国私营部门提供了一些必要的权力，可以将诸如采矿之类的空间运营商业化。但是，美国的迅速创新也导致了国际上一个不断发展的太空行业的道路，现在，外国比以前可以进入该行业。太空经济的国际化进一步凸显了现有太空政策框架的差距和失败。
Two main challenges must be addressed to ensure current governance structures are sufficient for securing the future of lunar mining. First is clarifying the rights of OST State Parties and affiliated nongovernmental operators to establish space objects on celestial bodies and to own the resources extracted. The OST, the primary governing tool in space (Figure 2), establishes that no State that signed the treaty may declare ownership over all or part of a celestial body like the moon. And despite the domestic authority bestowed by the 2015 Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, the multilateral OST does not address whether nongovernmental operators can claim territory and own resources they extract from celestial bodies. Thus, the OST promotes the peaceful and shared exploration of space and scientific research but几乎没有解决differences between research operations and new commercial opportunities like lunar mining. This leaves few options to resolve conflicts that may arise between competing private sector entities or States.
Even if domestic authorization of mining operations were sufficient, a second challenge has emerged: ensuring transparency and recordkeeping of different operations to maintain peaceful shared operations in space. Through the OST and the注册公约，各州已同意通知联合国太空活动的秘书长，并保持注册太空对象的记录（包括唯一标识符，位置和发射日期及其轨道路径）。但是，此注册过程仅在轨道中的地理空间位置涵盖空间对象，并且在旨在在天体表面上使用的太空对象的过程中存在空间，以及为一个目的而设计的航天器是否可以（即着陆）可以为另一个目的（即采矿）重新使用。如果其他实体也试图利用该土地，那么任何试图在月球表面进行采矿作业的团体来说，这几乎没有任何帮助。
尽管存在这些差距，但美国政府还是能够通过NASA的两党ARTEMIS计划和相应的Artemis Accord来扩大与月球相关的太空任务（图1），这是一套具有更新原则的双边协议。协议有24个签字人who collectively seek to reap the benefits of emerging space opportunities like mining. In part, the Artemis Accords aim to remedy the policy gaps of previous multilateral agreements like the OST by explicitly supporting private sector efforts to secure valuable resources like He-3 and water ice.
但协议不能解决key underlying challenges that could stifle U.S. innovation and leadership in space mining. For instance, while the Accords reaffirm the need to register space objects and propose the creation of safety zones surrounding lunar mining operations, gaps still remain in describing exactly how to register operations on celestial objects. This can be seen in Section 7 of the Artemis Accords, which states that space objects need to be registered, but does not specify what would classify as a “space object” or if an object registered for one purpose can be repurposed for other operations. Further, the Accords leave little room to address broader international tensions stemming from increased resource competition in space mining. While competition can have positive outcomes such as spurring rapid innovation, unchecked competition could escalate intomilitary conflict，尽管原始OST中有规定避免这种情况。
In particular, preemptive measures must be taken to alleviate potential tensions with other OST signatories in direct competition with the Accords. China and Russia are not party to the Accords and therefore do not need to abide by the agreement. In fact, these nations have declared opposition to the Accords and instead formed their own partnership to establish a competingInternational Lunar Research Station。As these programs develop concrete lunar applications, designating methods to determine who can conduct what type of operations on specific timelines and in specific locations will be a crucial form of anticipatory diplomacy.
行动计划
美国应提出，当任何州在天体上的操作之前注册一个空间对象时，它必须指定操作的预期位置；时间表；以及被描述为“意图”的操作类型进行以下操作：矿山/提取资源出售，进行科学研究或执行常规维护。这个多边开发的过程将阐明注册太空物体以和平占领天体对象表面的方法。
Additionally, the United States should propose the implementation of a process for States to resolve disputes through either bilateral negotiation or arbitration through another mutually agreed-upon third party such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). Similar disputes related to maritime resource extraction under the United Nations Law of the Seahave been resolved peacefullyusing the aforementioned双边谈判或第三方仲裁。这new dispute resolution process would similarly allow for peaceful resolution of competing claims on celestial body surfaces and resources.
为了指导创建太空对象仲裁过程，可以将其他此类过程（例如ICJ，PCA和国际海洋法法庭）用作模型。PCA在停止不公平的过程并在参与方之间建立对话方面取得了成功。它帮助较小的国家通过较大的国家建立仲裁程序，例如Ecuador vs. the United States，，，，in which the Republic of Ecuador instituted arbitral proceedings against the United States concerning the interpretation and application of an investment treaty between the two countries. In the short term, existing negotiation avenues will likely be sufficient to allow for dispute resolution. However, as the space industry continues to grow, it may eventually be necessary to establish an internationally recognized “Space Court” to arbitrate disputes. The国际海洋法法庭提供了可以仲裁空间争端的国际机构类型的例子。
这些预期的外交步骤可以通过三种方式之一：
- As a binding amendment to the OST:This would require the most time to implement, but this would also make it enforceable and binding, an obvious advantage. It would also provide an opportunity to bring all the important players to the table, specifically the parties who did not sign the Artemis Accords, and would help to start a discussion on the improvement of diplomatic relations for future space operations.
- As a nonbinding update to COPUOS Guidelines：这将更快地实施，但不能执行或具有约束力。
- As an update to the COPUOS Guidelines followed by an amendment to the OST:This would allow for both quick action in the nearer term and a permanent and enforceable implementation longer-term. Implementing a revised COPOUS could be a precursor to build support for the nonbinding updates to COPUOS. If the model is successful, State Parties would be more likely to agree to a binding amendment to OST. However they are implemented, these two proposed anticipatory diplomacy steps would improve the ability of space faring nations to peacefully use resources on celestial bodies.
这可以通过双边协议来完成吗？毕竟，美国通过与诸如国家的国家达成协议，展示了外交倡议法国，，，，Germany， 和India目的是将空间用于和平目的与合作，尽管他们没有明确提及采矿。但是，双边过程并不能为全球解决方案提供良好的前景。首先，美国与每个主要国家达成双边协议将非常慢，而且耗时。如果要在与双边贸易协议类似的时间表上达成太空挖掘协议，则每个协议都可以从一到六年生效。关键障碍是狼修正案，，，，which prevents the United States from entering into bilateral agreements with China, one of the its major competitors in the space industry. This restriction makes it hard to negotiate bilaterally with an important stakeholder concerning space mining.
Further, reaching these agreements would require addressing aspects of the Accords that have mademanymajor stakeholder countries hesitant to sign on. Thus, an easier path would be to operate diplomatically through the COPUOS, which already represents 95 major countries and oversees the existing multilateral space treaties and potential amendments to them. This approach would ensure that the United States still has some power over potential amendment language but would bring other major players into some sort of dialogue regarding the usage of space for commercial purposes.
While the COPUOS guidelines are not explicitly binding, they do provide a pathway for verification and arbitration, as well as a foundation for the adoption of a binding amendment or a new space treaty moving forward. Treaty negotiations are a slow, lengthy process; the OST requiredseveral years在1967年实现全面生效之前的工作。由于许多Artemis计划的目标依赖于成功的推出和2025年实现的里程碑，因此条约修正案并不是最及时的方法。延迟也可能是由于OST的某些当事方可能对采用另一个空间条约，该修正案的修正案有一定的保留。月亮协议。This agreement, which the United States is not party to, asserts that “the Moon and its natural resources are the common heritage of mankind and that an international regime should be established to govern the exploitation of such resources when such exploitation is about to become feasible.” Thus, countries that have signed the Moon Agreement probably want the moon to operate like a global commons with all countries on Earth having access to the fruits of lunar mining or other resource extraction. Negotiations with these nations will require time to complete.
这U.S. State Department’sOffice of Space Affairs，，，，under the Bureau of Oceans and Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES), is the lead office for space diplomacy, exploration, and commercialization and would be the ideal office to craft the required legislation for an OST amendment. Additionally, the条约事务办公室，，，，which is often tasked with writing up the legal framework of treaties, could provide guidance on the legislation and help initiate the process within the U.S. State Department and the United Nations. Existing U.S. law like the Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, and international treaties like OST and Registration Convention, provide authority for these proposals to be implemented in the short term. However, negotiation of updates to COPOUS Guidelines and amendments to the OST and other relevant space treaties over the next 5 to 10 years will be essential to their long term success.
Finally, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) at the Department of Transportation would be the logical federal agency to initially lead implementing the updated registration process for U.S.-affiliated space objects and for verifying the location and intended use of space objects from other nations. FAA implements the current U.S.空间对象注册的过程。In the long term it could be appropriate to transfer responsibility for space object registration to the rapidly growing Office of Space Commerce (OSC) at the Department of Commerce. Moving responsibilities for implementing space object registration and verification to the OSC would provide opportunities for the office to expand with the rapidly expanding space industry. This change would also allow the FAA to focus on its primary responsibilities for regulating the domestic aerospace industry.
结论
道格拉斯·亚当斯（Douglas Adams）可能会说：“空间很大。您只是不会相信它是多么广泛，巨大，令人难以置信的大大。”尽管亚当斯描述了空间的庞大规模，但此描述也适用于外太空科学和经济前景的规模。毕竟，任何新的经济剧院都不会在短短几十年内发展成数万亿美元的市场。但是，如果没有计划避免与其他外太空演员的潜在冲突的计划，那么美国在这个新兴剧院的未来努力将被陷入困境。改进的空间采矿协作为促进国际合作和经济发展提供了一个机会，而太空中的军事冲突为当前和未来太空行业的经济潜力带来了高风险。透明且广泛同意的框架将使对天体对象的科学研究和资源提取和平竞争。
Lunar mining has shown promise for providing access to water ice, rare earth metals, He-3, and other raw materials crucial for the further exploration of space. Providing a peaceful and secure source of these materials would build on the bipartisan通讯ercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act’s从长远来看，空间资源提取准则，进一步使美国电网的现代化和脱碳为公共利益。
为了促进空间的和平探索和发展，我们必须更新现有的国际法，即Copuos指南，OST或两者兼而有之，以阐明国家参与者进行的位置，时间表和外在空间操作的类型。我们还必须为OST当事方提出反应机制，以通过双边谈判或ICJ或PCA等相互接受的第三方进行仲裁和平解决争议。正如美国带领世界进入20世纪的“最终边界”一样，我们也必须领导21日的下一章。如果成功实施，我们提出的预期空间外交将允许几十年来共同使用天体。
Acknowledgments
Dr. Sindhu Nathan provided valuable insights into the writing of this memo.
这re would be no additional cost to the recommendation outside of existing costs for diplomatic and U.N. activities. The Artemis Program is expected to cost$93 billionthrough 2025 and Congressional appropriators are已经质疑了每个计划发布的数十亿美元的价格标签。因此，澄清这些法律框架可能有助于激励私人创新并降低启动成本。该提议几乎没有额外的费用可以促进经济利益。因此，美国和阿耳emi弥斯的国家具有既得利益，以确保这些持续的投资导致成功的任务，并尽可能少。该提案还可能会促进进一步的私人投资和创新，并防止对军事冲突投资的风险。
另一个类似的条约，即1961年的《南极条约》，是一个很好的例子，说明了不同国家如何团结并建立对话以有效管理和共享共同资源。尽管该地区用于各种科学目的，但所有国家都可以和平与合作的方式这样做。这部分是因为《南极条约》已经systematically updated反映不断变化的时期，尤其是关于environment。OST没有经历任何这样的changes。Thus, updating the COPUOS would provide a means for the United States to take the lead in ensuring that space remains a common shared resource and that no country can unfairly claim a monopoly over it.
Nuclear fusion is currently not commercially viable. However, significant interest and investment is currently centered around this potential energy source, and突破该领域的主要研究人员最近报告了该技术。如果该行业在商业上可行，那么对HE-3的访问将是至关重要的。
OST目前允许州政党观察任何其他OST州政党的太空航班和访问设备。各州可以使用这种权力来确保遵循这些准则的一种方式是针对州和Copuos跟踪天体上发生了多少种和哪种类型的空间对象操作。（美国国防部已经跟踪了over 26,000 outer space objects, but cross-referencing with COPUOS could help differentiate between debris and state objects of interest.) Interested or concerned parties could verify the accuracy of registered operations of space objects on celestial bodies led by other States, and any violations of the new guidelines could be referred to the new dispute resolution process.
In the United States, the Guidelines would be ratified in the same way as other United Nations regulations and international treaties, in the form of an执行协议。这se are directly implemented by the president and do not require a majority in the Senate to be passed but are still法律约束。
像联合国这样的中立组织的目的是在强大的国家之间进行有意义的对话。由于空间是一种共同的共享资源，因此最好确保所有各方都有一个阶段，成为处理资源共享的会谈的一部分。为一项流行条约提出指南是一个不错的起点，美国可以通过迈出第一步来表现领导地位，同时还提倡对美国利益有益的术语。
All the signatories of the COPOUS meet every year to discuss the effectiveness of the treaty, and countries propose various statements to the chair of the committee. (这United States’ statements from the 65th meeting of the committee in 2022 can be found here.) Although there is no obvious precedent where a statement has directly been converted into guidelines, it would still be useful to make a statement regarding a possible addition of guidelines, and one could reasonably hope it could open doors for negotiations.
仲裁程序诸如《联合国海洋法公约》中所述的仲裁过程确保强大的国家无法统治较小的国家或以战争的可能性吓到他们。尽管OST国家必须执行仲裁程序的判决，但它为立即军事冲突提供了和平替代方案。这至少将停止争议的诉讼，并为参与争议的各州收集资源和支持。仲裁过程的存在将加强以下原则：所有大小的OST国家都有权作为所有人的平等资源访问空间。